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CHAPTER 15
Summing Up
Achievements, Problems and Prospects
Christopher J. O'Leary
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
Stephen A. Wandner
Urban Institute and UI Service, U.S. Department of Labor
The unemployment insurance (UI) program began modestly. Initial 
coverage and eligibility provisions reflected a depression-era concern 
about the ability to finance new unemployment benefits. Based on fed 
eral law, coverage was originally restricted to firms having eight or 
more employees, each working at least 20 weeks in a year. No agricul 
tural, household, nonprofit, or government employees were covered.
The benefit replacement rate most state laws set—50 percent up to a 
maximum weekly benefit amount of $15—was quite generous. How 
ever, benefits were usually not payable until after a 3-or-4-week wait 
ing period had elapsed, and maximum benefit durations ranged 
between 12 and 20 weeks, being 16 weeks in most states. Payment was 
only made to involuntarily unemployed persons who were able and 
available for work. Eligibility and disqualification rules were tight. 
Unemployed workers who quit their previous job, refused suitable 
work, or were discharged for misconduct were generally disqualified 
for the duration of their unemployment (Blaustein 1993, pp. 159-169).
As World War II began, unemployment plummeted and the outlook 
for the UI program became more optimistic. The program entered a 
period of expansion, which continued into the 1960s and 1970s. It was 
felt that more benefits via higher benefit maximums, longer benefit 
durations, and decreased waiting periods could be financed. States also
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expanded coverage, while at the same time reducing taxes and increas 
ing the use of experience rating.
Today, there is powerful pressure to reduce the size of government 
and to decrease or eliminate some government programs, especially 
domestic ones. Despite this situation, the UI program today is 
respected as a fundamental part of the foundation for a competitive 
labor market. There are political pressures to transfer at least some of 
the federal responsibilities under the program to the states. The main 
target of devolution advocates is the administrative funding of the pro 
gram. Nonetheless, it appears likely that UI will survive as a model 
federal-state program, even if there is a tilt toward more state control.
Benefit liberality reached its high point in the 1970s; since then, the 
generosity of both the regular and extended benefit programs has been 
in decline. Both state and federal UI policy has become increasingly 
restrictive. The permanent Extended Benefit program has been espe 
cially affected.
Federal UI policy is highly cyclical. In periods of prosperity, the 
program has largely been ignored; during recessions, pressures build to 
extend benefit durations. Because of the prior weakening of the perma 
nent Extended Benefit program, during the past two recessions tempo 
rary emergency programs have been the primary vehicle for extending 
durations. These issues are examined in the following section of this 
chapter.
The chapter then presents summary comments on UI taxation. The 
discussion of benefit financing reviews trends in financing, proposals 
to increase the taxable wage base, and experience rating in relation to 
temporary and permanent layoffs. Administrative funding is consid 
ered in terms of distributional issues between states and the adequacy 
of annual federal budget appropriations.
Although ideas for reforms have come from many sources, there has 
been no comprehensive revision of the UI program since the enactment 
of the Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1976. Two advi 
sory bodies have been established by Congress to review the UI pro 
gram and to make policy recommendations: the National Commission 
on Unemployment Compensation in 1976 and the Advisory Council on 
Unemployment Compensation in 1991. The fourth section of this con 
cluding chapter reviews the recommendations of these two bodies, fol-
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lowed by a discussion of the important concept of preserving the 
insurance principle in section five.
During the past decade, various innovative ideas to change the UI 
system have been proposed and investigated. The integration of the UI 
system into a broader reemployment system has also begun as part of 
the response to the growth in permanent job loss and worker disloca 
tion. Ideas for new approaches to the UI program, particularly for 
reemploying UI recipients, have emerged from a series of state and 
federal field experiments in UI conducted over the past ten years. Some 
of the findings from these experiments have resulted in federal legisla 
tion that improves the reemployment incentives in UI. This experience 
is discussed, along with the response of the UI system to new technolo 
gies for administration of benefits and the system's potential to adjust 
to fundamental changes in the labor force behavior of American work 
ers. The concluding section considers the likely future of the UI pro 
gram.
Benefit Trends in the Unemployment Insurance System
The total benefits paid by the UI system can be expressed as the 
product of the number of benefit recipients, the average benefit level, 
and the average duration of benefits. The information needed to com 
pute the total can be gathered as the answers to three simple questions: 
who, how much, and how long? More specifically:
Who? Persons with recent labor market experience 
unemployed through no fault of their own
How much? Partial wage replacement 
How long? Temporary wage replacement
Trends in benefit payments from the system depend on answers to one 
or more of these and related questions. This is the approach of our brief 
review of coverage and eligibility in this section.
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Who Receives Benefits? Coverage, Eligibility, and Disqualifications
Coverage under UI is generally defined by the industry or other 
characteristics of the employer. UI coverage has gradually expanded 
over the past sixty years as it became clear that covering all experi 
enced wage and salary workers was feasible. The 1976 amendments 
left experienced wage and salary workers uncovered in only a very few 
industries and types of firms.
Given the nature of UI as an insurance system, the reason for job 
separation is crucial to determining eligibility, and thus how many of 
the Ul-covered ultimately receive benefits. The UI program generally 
only compensates experienced wage and salary workers who have lost 
their jobs through no fault of their own.
In the Current Population Survey (CPS), the household survey from 
which total employment and unemployment are estimated, one may 
enter unemployment for any one of four reasons. One may have lost a 
job, left a job, be a new entrant to the labor force, or be a reentrant 
returning to the labor force after some hiatus. Under the various current 
state laws, as shown in table 15.1, UI only has the potential to compen 
sate 40 to 60 percent of all the unemployed who are job losers. Since 
UI typically provides only 26 weeks of benefits, its true potential is the 
even smaller fraction of job losers who are unemployed up to 26 
weeks. A sizable proportion of this population actually receives UI 
benefits.
The relationship between the number of job losers and the number 
of workers claiming UI—the average weekly insured unemployment 
(AWIU)—in the regular UI program has fluctuated over time. 
Throughout the 1970s, the number of regular program UI claimants 
approximated the number of job losers. Since the early 1980s that frac 
tion has been at a much lower level, although there are signs of 
rebound since 1984. Actual benefit receipt reflects demographic and 
economic factors as well as state UI laws. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 of this 
book reviewed the issues of coverage and of initial and continuing eli 
gibility that influence who collects UI benefits.
Coverage
As noted, since the 1976 amendments, most wage and salary work 
ers are in jobs covered by UI. Agricultural and household workers are
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the main groups outside UI coverage. A much larger group that could 
be covered consists of the self-employed. Reducing or eliminating 
requirements for substantial work experience to embrace new labor 
force entrants and reentrants could also greatly increase the number of 
workers covered by UI, although coverage of these last two groups is 
hard to justify on insurance grounds.
Self-employment has grown rapidly in the United States. According 
to the U.S. Small Business Administration, the number of self- 
employed workers in the United States rose from 5.99 million individ 
uals in 1981 to 6.46 million in 1985. In 1985, 9.1 percent of all nonag- 
ricultural workers were engaged in self-employment (U.S. Small 
Business Administration 1989). This sharp growth has removed an 
increasing portion of the U.S. labor force from potential UI coverage. 
There are considerable conceptual and practical barriers to covering 
the self-employed within the current UI framework. These include dif 
ficulties in distinguishing periods of employment from periods of 
unemployment, determining the level of wages and salaries during 
periods of employment, and ascertaining reasons for separation.
Making coverage available to workers without recent labor market 
experience would allow some new entrants and reentrants to be benefi 
ciaries under the UI program. Such coverage opens up another series of 
problems. First, UI in the United States is an insurance program that 
provides protection against the risk of involuntary unemployment. 
Covering those with no recent labor market experience would violate 
the insurance principle by allowing benefits to be paid to those who 
choose to leave the status of nonemployment for that of unemploy 
ment. This would make the UI program a form of unemployment com 
pensation or unemployment assistance that exists in some other 
industrial countries. Second, there is the issue of setting the level and 
duration of benefits. Clearly there would be no wage or employment 
history on which to base benefits; they would have to be uniform or be 
based on need.
Covering new entrants and reentrants to the labor force would result 
in UI becoming a dual system. Benefits for experienced workers would 
be based on labor market experience—an insurance principle—while 
benefits for everyone else would be based on need—a welfare princi 
ple. Both parts would have to be administered, simultaneously and
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side-by-side. Other developed industrial nations have shown little 
enthusiasm for such coverage.
Eligibility and Disqualification
Over the past five decades, states have gradually tightened UI eligi 
bility criteria. This tightening has involved both initial eligibility and 
continuing eligibility for UI benefits. To retain the insurance character 
of UI, states have tended to exclude most claimants who voluntarily 
leave a job from initial UI eligibility. Over the years, the states have 
wrestled with whether to make these unemployed workers eligible 
after some fixed, limited period of time or to disqualify them for the 
entire period of their unemployment. The logic of a limited disqualifi 
cation is that, while an unemployed worker may have originally left a 
job voluntarily, after a certain period of time the unemployment effec 
tively becomes involuntary, as a result of labor market conditions and 
not because of the personal choice to quit the prior job. At first, most 
states disqualified claimants for the whole benefit year. As can be seen 
in table 15.2, by 1952, most states had adopted limited-duration dis 
qualifications. The pendulum has swung back sharply since 1970.
Table 15.2 Number of States with Disqualifications for the Duration of 































SOURCE- U.S. Department of Labor (various years, 1952-1995)
A trend toward tightening eligibility was completed by 1990. While 
from the 1940s through much of the 1960s the UI program served both 
job losers and, with a delay, job leavers, the tide then turned. Today, 
nearly all states serve job losers only. As can be seen from table 15.1,
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the result has been a cut in the portion of unemployed workers who 
could potentially receive UI from about three-fifths to about one-half. 
It does not seem likely that the current state restrictions on eligibility 
for voluntarily leaving a job—or for other reasons, such as discharge 
for misconduct or refusal of suitable work—will change substantially 
in the near future.
How Long Are Benefits Provided?
The duration of benefits is related to two different policy consider 
ations: the maximum potential duration of benefits under the regular 
program and the availability and potential duration of extended bene 
fits. For the first two decades of the UI program, there were no 
extended benefit programs. The question to be answered was the fol 
lowing: How long a period of temporary unemployment should be 
compensated?
In 1958, Congress began a lengthy, fitful debate over the issue of 
long-term unemployment compensation. The discussion concerned 
whether there was a federal responsibility to deal with unemployment 
that states decided endured beyond the "temporary" period they could 
afford to insure, and whether this should be addressed from the stand 
point of the affected individual or of whole geographic areas.
Regular Unemployment Insurance Duration
The appropriate maximum potential duration of benefits under the 
regular UI program seems to have been settled by consensus. A maxi 
mum potential duration of 26 weeks of regular benefits is now the 
norm. Only two states, Washington and Massachusetts, offer a different 
maximum duration of 30 weeks.
At the inception of the federal-state UI program, there was a lack of 
uniformity among states on the maximum potential duration of bene 
fits. Because of early actuarial studies that expected far greater 
demands on the UI system than in fact occurred, six months of benefits 
seemed financially out of reach. In 1940, with all state UI programs 
operational, the most popular maximum potential duration of benefits 
was 16 weeks. As seen in table 15.3, twenty-seven states offered up to 
16 weeks, fourteen had shorter potential durations, and nine had longer
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potential durations: only two states ventured to the current norm of 26 
weeks.









































































































SOURCE U.S Department of Labor, Significant Provisions of Unemployment Laws, various 
issues, 1940-1995.
State attitudes about the maximum potential duration of UI changed 
rapidly after World War II. The war years had been a period of low 
unemployment, and an expected postwar recession never materialized. 
As a result, maximum durations expanded rapidly. In the late 1940s, a 
large plurality of states selected 20 weeks as their maximum. In the 
1950s, however, a consensus began to emerge that 26 weeks was the 
right figure for the UI program. By 1960, thirty-three states had legis 
lated 26-week maximums, and by 1980, forty-two. Interestingly, 
between 1960 and 1980 about nine states fluted with longer (27- to-39- 
week) durations. Since 1990, seven of them have dropped back to the 
consensus 26-week limit.
Today, a maximum of six months of regular UI benefits is viewed as 
standard. It is the base from which extended benefits have been consid 
ered and implemented. The 26-week maximum duration is likely to 
continue to be a fixed feature for the near future of the regular UI pro 
gram. The determination of states not to pay more than 26 weeks of
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benefits pointed to the need for extended support during a period of 
high unemployment. When the permanent Extended Benefit program 
was created in 1970, it took for granted the emerging norm of 26 weeks 
of regular UI benefits and built an extension upon that base.
Extended Duration of Unemployment Insurance Benefits
Debate on extended UI benefits centers on two main issues. The first 
has been a concern since the 1950s: How to deal with long-term cycli 
cal unemployment? The other issue dates mainly from the early 1980s 
and concerns long-term unemployment due to structural change rather 
than to fluctuations in the business cycle.
Despite concerns about the importance of long-term cyclical unem 
ployment and the problem of workers who are permanently separated 
from their previous employment, most unemployed persons are only 
temporarily disconnected from their jobs. As a result, the UI program 
mainly provides short-term income support to workers who return to 
the same or similar jobs. In fact, since 1971, the average duration for 
an insured spell of unemployment has varied between a low of 5.4 
weeks in 1974 and a high of 8.1 weeks in 1993. The duration per spell 
of unemployment remained at a high level of 7.9 weeks in 1994, 
despite the improved economy. Nonetheless, only 27- 40 percent of 
regular program beneficiaries exhausted their entitlement to UI benefits 
in each of the past twenty-five years.
The policy history of extended UI benefits reflects the view of the 
federal government that most recessions are national in scope and 
require a federal policy response. The programs also reflect the politi 
cal reaction of Congress to the needs of constituents when recessions 
increase both the numbers of job losers and their durations of unem 
ployment. High rates of regular benefit exhaustion have frequently 
prompted a congressional response.
As discussed in chapter 6, long-term unemployment during reces 
sionary periods has generated a congressional response in the form of 
both the permanent Extended Benefit (EB) program and a series of 
temporary (generally third-tier) emergency programs. The first tempo 
rary emergency program was enacted during the 1958 recession. The 
permanent EB program, enacted in 1970, was designed to eliminate the 
need for such ad hoc congressional responses to each recession. That 
intent has not been realized. Regardless of the strength of the perma-
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nent EB program, since its enactment, Congress has felt a need to 
intervene with additional programs in each recession.
Table 15.4 Extended Benefits and Emergency Program Benefits as a 
Percentage of Regular Program Benefits
Payment period Extended benefits Emergency benefits as
as a percentage a percentage










SOURCE U S. Department of Labor, UI Database.
Table 15.4 summarizes the relative importance of the permanent and 
temporary extended benefit programs over the past two-and-a-half 
decades by listing the percentage of regular benefits paid by each dur 
ing recession periods. The table shows that the permanent EB program 
as originally enacted was a true second-tier program. During the 1974- 
1975 recession, EB payments exceeded the temporary Federal Supple 
mental Benefits despite the high level of payments by this third-tier 
program. EB payments declined in the early 1980s after the legislative 
tightening of the program in 1981. Finally, in the most recent reces 
sion, EB payments became negligible, and Emergency Unemployment 
Compensation bore the full weight of providing benefits for regular 
program exhaustees.
How Much Is Paid in Weekly Benefits ?
A central standard of UI since program inception has been replace 
ment of 50 percent of lost wages and salaries for the great majority of 
claimants. Most state UI formulas do replace about half of lost wages 
and salaries up to a maximum benefit. However, despite fifty years of 
exhortation and unsuccessful federal legislative efforts, the goal of 
replacing half of prior wages for the great majority of UI recipients has 
not been approached. The main impediment is usually the fixed state
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maximum benefit level, which constrains the replacement rate for 
high-wage individuals (see Haber and Murray 1966, pp. 441-444; 
O'Leary 1996).
In general, during the past half century, the rule advocated to 
achieve the goal of 50 percent wage replacement for most workers has 
been to set the maximum benefit amount at two-thirds of the average 
weekly wage in the state. While nine states had provisions in 1996 to 
set the maximum weekly benefit amount at or above two-thirds of the 
state average weekly wage (see table 5.2 in chapter 5), as table 15.5 
shows, in 1993, on the basis of aggregate average data, only one state 
had a maximum weekly benefit that high. In most states, in fact, the 
maximum was less than 50 percent of their average weekly wage.
Table 15.5 Maximum Weekly Benefit Amount as a Percentage of the 
Average Weekly Wage, Calendar Year 1993
Number of states
Less than 40% 8 
40 - 49% 23 
50 - 59% 15 
60 - 65% 6 
66 2/3% or more _______________________ 1 __________
SOURCE U.S Department of Labor, UI Database
As a result, the U.S. gross replacement rate — the average weekly 
benefit amount divided by the average weekly wage — has been con 
siderably below the targeted 50 percent. Throughout the post- World 
War II period, UI benefits have generally replaced about one third of 
lost income. As shown in table 5.1, since 1947 the gross replacement 
rate has only varied between 0.32 and 0.37.
Individual state replacement rates reflect specific legislative provi 
sions, and the national replacement rate masks big differences between 
states. At the high end, Hawaii replaces 51 percent, and Kansas and 
Rhode Island replace 44 percent. At the low end, California and Alaska 
replace 28 percent.
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The Gap Between Insured and Total Unemployment
Since the early 1980s, there has been growing interest in the propor 
tion of unemployed workers who receive UI benefits. The U.S. Depart 
ment of Labor has funded four studies to better understand this issue 
(see Burtless and Saks 1984; Corson and Nicholson 1988; Vroman 
1991). This research has provided insight into the reasons for the gap 
between total unemployment, as measured by the CPS, and insured 
unemployment. Another formulation of this concept is the recipiency 
rate, which is the proportion of all unemployed who receive UI bene 
fits.
As discussed in chapter 2, the gap has also become an important 
policy issue because of the belief that closing much of it is within the 
control of state and federal governments. However, research funded by 
the Department of Labor has shown that much of the gap is due to fac 
tors not directly influenced by policy action. The causal factors identi 
fied by research include the changing industrial mix of employment in 
the United States and the way that unemployment is measured.
The gap has been a target of critics who argue that the UI system is 
inadequate, both with respect to the regular UI program at all times and 
to extended benefit programs during recessionary periods. The size of 
the gap is related to nearly all of the benefit payment provisions of the 
program. Eligibility and disqualification provisions directly determine 
who receives benefits, and duration provisions determine how long 
benefits are paid. Furthermore, the level of UI benefits may affect 
whether unemployed workers apply for benefits and how long they 
draw benefits.
Another major concern about the gap, measured as the ratio of 
insured unemployment to total unemployment, is the fact that UI bene 
fit provisions keep the ratio low for the regular UI program as com 
pared to that of other developed industrial nations. The gap also varies 
with the business cycle and falls during periods of economic expan 
sion. As a result, advocates for wider availability of regular benefits 
frequently criticize the program because of the low percentage of the 
total unemployed drawing UI benefits during peaks in the business 
cycle (see Baldwin and McHugh 1992).
As shown in table 15.6, the annual average recipiency rate for the 
regular program has varied between 29 and 50 percent since 1967. The
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NOTE: The category "all programs", includes regular state UI, and UI benefits for former civilian 
federal employees (UCEF), former armed services personnel (UCX), railroad employees (RR), 
extended benefits (EB), federal supplemental benefits (FSB), special unemployment assistance 
(SUA), federal supplemental compensation (FSC), and extended unemployment compensation 
(EUC).
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size of the gap reflects the nature of the UI program as a system to par 
tially compensate for job loss. While job losers make up about half of 
all unemployed persons, as can be seen in table 15.1, their share of the 
total grows during periods of recession. Policy actions that could 
reduce the gap include broadening coverage, extending program dura 
tion, and easing initial and continuing eligibility provisions.
While small potential increases in coverage among agricultural 
employees, domestic workers, and nonprofit employees can be made, 
expanding coverage can reduce the gap for the regular UI program 
only by expanding beyond the traditional areas and diminishing its 
insurance character. Examining the situation for all UI programs, 
including extended benefit programs, reveals another possible way to 
close the gap. During recessions, extended benefit programs have 
greatly raised the ratio of the insured to total unemployed. The ratio 
reached as high as 75 percent in 1975. Thus, although generous 
extended benefit programs would do little to reduce the large gap in 
times of low unemployment, extended benefits could cut the gap con 
siderably during recessionary periods when job losers become a much 
larger share of all unemployed.
Finally, table 2.1 shows the wide differences in the gap among 
states. In 1993, the proportion of the unemployed claiming UI ranged 
from 64 percent in Alaska to 15 percent in South Dakota. The gap also 
varies systematically by region of the country. It tends to be smallest in 
New England and on the West Coast, and largest in the South, the 
Southwest and in the Rocky Mountain states. The wide disparity in the 
gap by state is evidence that differences in state policy and state admin 
istration with regard to regular UI program parameters are the principal 
policy determinant. Thus, to a considerable extent, closing the gap is 
an issue of the tightness or looseness of state UI law and policy.
Although one may speak of closing the gap, in reality, eliminating it 
is an illusion—if we compare UI claimants to the total population of 
total unemployed persons. The gap exists partly because of the exclu 
sion of new entrants and reentrants, whose coverage is beyond the 
scope of an insurance program.
By the 1980s, the UI program had evolved into a system that pays 
benefits to job losers only for a period of up to 26 weeks, except in 
times of recession. As a result, a reasonable baseline for analyzing UI 
recipiency can be directed at unemployed workers who have lost their
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job and who are unemployed for under 27 weeks. This approach would 
suggest comparing actual recipiency to the level of recipiency if all job 
losers unemployed less than 27 weeks claimed UI benefits. For this 
group, it can be seen in figure 15.1 that the UI program serves the great 
majority of short-term job losers. While the proportion has declined 
somewhat in recent years, since the early 1980s the UI program has 
still served about four-fifths of this segment of the unemployed popula 
tion. State and federal policy changes could have opened up benefit 
receipt to a wider number of unemployed workers which would have 
raised the recipiency rate further. For example, eligibility could be 
extended to a small portion of unemployed workers who had low base- 
period earnings or had worked part-time.
Trends in Unemployment Insurance Financing
Benefit Financing
Overly pessimistic economic assumptions used during the design of 
the federal-state UI system in the 1930s resulted in lower-than- 
expected benefit charges and higher-than-needed revenues. There was 
a substantial buildup of reserves prior to initial benefit payments in the 
late 1930s. On top of this, the virtual full employment during the years 
of World War II resulted in the excessive accumulation of reserves. As 
a result, as shown in figure 8.2, UI taxes were reduced sharply at the 
end of the war, largely through the state-by-state spread of experience 
rating.
Despite initial overfunding, the UI system began moving toward 
long-term financial problems. The process started with the imposition 
of a maximum UI taxable wage base, set at $3,000 in 1939. It contin 
ued with the failure of state and federal legislators to follow the exam 
ple set by the social security system of gradually increasing the taxable 
wage base to more or less keep up with inflation. The result of the 
diverging taxable wage bases for the two programs is summarized in 
figure 8.4.
While the taxable wage base has remained relatively constant in 
nominal terms, it has steadily declined both in real terms and relative to
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average wages. The small increases in the taxable wage base have 
proved to be only modest and temporary exceptions to the trend. 
Although the UI average tax rate on taxable wages has been on an 
upward trend since World War II, as shown in figure 8.3, the UI system 
has not achieved a sound financial footing in large part because of the 
shrinking taxable wage base. Benefit levels, on the other hand, have 
increased with wages and prices and have remained relatively constant 
in real terms.
Chapter 9 points out that, although the period from 1979 to the 
present has seen some rebuilding of the UI trust fund, reserves have not 
reached the level attained just before the 1974-1975 recession. The 
rebuilding was spurred in part by the decision of the federal govern 
ment to begin charging interest on state trust fund borrowing in 1982. 
Although this provided a strong incentive for states to maintain a sol 
vent trust fund, the recovery of adequate state trust fund reserves has 
been modest. As chapter 9 discusses, part of the explanation for this 
limited growth in reserves may be the increased reliance by states on a 
responsive financing system rather than on a system that makes exten 
sive and substantial use of forward funding. State legislatures have felt 
political pressure to reduce UI tax rates, even when state trust fund 
accounts have been below the level considered sufficient on an actuar 
ial basis to weather the next recession.
One policy conclusion from this analysis that economists widely 
accept is a need to increase the UI taxable wage base and then to index 
the wage base to keep up with inflation. This is a conclusion of Levine 
in chapter 8. It has also been a recommendation of the National Com 
mission on Unemployment Compensation in 1980 and of the Advisory 
Council on Unemployment Compensation in 1995. Despite this wide 
spread policy consensus, strong opposition in the business community 
has meant little movement in the UI taxable wage base throughout six 
decades of the program, and no increase in the base in well over a 
decade. The result is an enormous difference between the taxable wage 
bases of the two programs which started at the same time. While the 
indexed wage base for social security stands at $65,400 in 1997, the UI 
program continues with a federal taxable wage base of $7,000 and little 
prospect for change.
Another concern of economists in their study of the UI system since 
at least the 1970s has been the impact of imperfect experience rating.
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Analysis has demonstrated how less-than-perfect experience rating 
offers incentives to employers to initiate temporary layoffs. For exam 
ple, Levine concludes in chapter 8 that layoffs would be 20 to 50 per 
cent lower in a perfectly experience-rated system.
While perfect experience rating has never been a goal of the state or 
federal policy makers, the degree of experience rating differs widely 
among states. Analysts have tried to draw attention to this variation by 
developing empirical measures of experience rating. These indexes 
have been analyzed and measured over the past decade and a half (see 
Wandner and Crosslin 1980; Topel 1984; Hunt and O'Leary 1989; 
Vroman 1989). The Department of Labor has published an experience- 
rating index for each state since 1988. There is not yet any indication 
that its publication has resulted in any measurable change in overall 
experience rating or even in a narrowing of variation among states in 
their degree of experience rating.
Although most economists believe that the degree of experience rat 
ing should be increased, policy makers cannot necessarily agree on 
whether or how this should be done. For example, in its final report 
released in January 1996, the Advisory Council on Unemployment 
Compensation did not offer a majority recommendation on this matter.
Most analysis of the experience rating of UI taxes has been directed 
at its role in financing temporary periods of unemployment. Brechling 
and Laurence (1995) have investigated how experience rating might 
operate in response to permanent layoffs. As mentioned throughout 
this book, permanent job separations resulting from business restruc 
turing and plant closings have increased tremendously since the 1980s. 
New UI financing strategies must address this issue.
Brechling and Laurence (1995) conclude in their book that increas 
ing the extent of experience rating is as appropriate in the case of per 
manent layoffs as in the case of temporary layoffs, but caution that it is 
more difficult to accomplish. They argue that, just as for temporary 
layoffs, experience rating for permanent layoffs can be improved by 
raising maximum tax rates and lowering minimum tax rates. However, 
Brechling and Laurence assert that these actions alone are not suffi 
cient. They advocate additional steps to require that firms with declin 
ing employment internalize a greater share of the costs that result from 
their layoffs.
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Brechling and Laurence (1995) recommend two additional changes: 
(1) shortening the time lag when determining the UI tax rate for an 
employer; and (2) uniform adoption of the reserve ratio method of 
experience rating, with several modifications. To minimize the time lag 
in setting employer tax rates, they propose that the UI tax rate for the 
current year be determined by the employer's reserve ratio at the end of 
the prior year.
They favor the reserve ratio system of experience rating for two 
main reasons. First, a positive trust fund balance could easily be incor 
porated as an asset on the firm's balance sheet, while a negative bal 
ance could be entered as a liability. Requiring these entries on the 
balance sheet may induce firms to more fully consider the UI tax con 
sequences of layoff actions. Second, if a firm goes into bankruptcy, its 
positive balance would be refunded, while any negative balance would 
make the state UI trust fund a creditor in legal proceedings. These rec 
ommendations directly address the problem the UI program faces in 
financing benefit payments for inactive employers. Finally, Brechling 
and Laurence recommend that firms be paid interest on their positive 
trust fund balances and be charged interest on their negative balances. 
Interest owed by negative balance employers would be collected in 
cash, while interest payable would be added to the firm's positive bal 
ance. By penalizing negative balances and rewarding positive balances, 
these policy recommendations are intended to encourage firms to build 
up UI trust funds.
The analysis of the financing of both temporary and permanent lay 
offs assumes that raising experience-rated charges to employers will 
result in greater internalizing of UI costs by employers imposing lay 
offs. Employers, however, are not charged for layoffs until determina 
tions are made by the state UI agency that they are responsible for the 
given layoffs. As a result, firms have an incentive to challenge the attri 
bution of layoffs to them. The growth of challenges related to benefits 
and separation issues and the growth of private service bureaus, which 
manage UI accounts for both private and public employers, are indica 
tions that employers are choosing to dispute potential charges to their 
UI account, either themselves or through their agents. To date, there 
has been no study of the effect of UI service bureaus on the personnel 
policies of employers or on the operation of UI. Such a study would
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enlighten policy on experience rating and benefit eligibility; however, 
proper data to investigate this issue would be very difficult to obtain.
Administrative Financing
Administrative financing is discussed at length in chapter 13 as a 
federal-state relations issue. In one sense, UI administrative financing 
should be very simple and straightforward. The UI program is very 
efficiently administered, it is highly automated, and its costs are low. 
Administration costs about six cents per dollar of benefits paid and 
about three cents per dollar of tax collections. Nonetheless, there are a 
number of controversial questions in UI administrative financing. Who 
should collect FUTA tax money that is used for administrative financ 
ing and other purposes? How should the administrative funds be dis 
tributed among the states? Also, how much money should be 
distributed each year?
In chapter 13, West and Hildebrand discuss the issue in the context 
of the search for balance between the federal and state partners in the 
system. Contention between the partners is probably greatest over the 
question of how big the total administrative financing level should be, 
as opposed to the question of how money should be allocated among 
states.
Just as subsidies flow from employers with low layoffs to employers 
with high layoffs due to imperfectly experience-rated financing of ben 
efit charges, cross subsidies between the states have long existed in 
administrative financing. These cross-subsidies have been measured by 
the U.S. Department of Labor for nearly two decades, and the results 
have been published and made available to the states and other inter 
ested parties (see Van Erden and Wandner 1979). Unlike the undesir 
able subsidies in benefit financing, the subsidies in administrative 
financing are intentional and closely managed. The principal reason for 
administrative cross-subsidies is to accommodate the differences in UI 
workloads, which result mainly during recessionary periods that do not 
impact all regions of the country equally. These cross-subsidies accom 
modate regional downturns such as the "Oil Patch" recession of the 
mid-1980s. Persistent cross-subsidies also result from the higher cost 
of administering UI programs in low-density, low-population regions.
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While many cross-subsidies tend to be intermittent and to move 
from one portion of the country to the other, historically there have 
been some persistent "winners" and "losers" among the states. Not sur 
prisingly, the persistent losers have tended to spearhead the demand for 
devolution of UI administrative funding. The call for an end to cross- 
subsidies in UI administrative financing and more limited calls for the 
end of federal extended benefits seem to represent a retreat from the 
national public policy focus of UI.
Of great public policy concern is the developing problem of inade 
quate total resources for UI administrative financing. UI is an entitle 
ment program and, as such, it is treated as a "mandatory" item in the 
federal budget. The funds needed to pay UI benefits are thus automati 
cally appropriated. Administrative financing, however, is treated as 
"discretionary" under the federal budget. This means that UI adminis 
trative financing must compete with other items for funding within the 
single, limited federal budget appropriation for the U.S. Departments 
of Labor, Education, and Health and Human Services. As a result, there 
is no guarantee that the funding needed to administer UI workloads 
and to cover state salary increases will be made available. There is a 
basic contradiction in recognizing that UI benefits payments are driven 
by state unemployment, while ignoring the fact that claims loads affect 
administrative costs as well. Concern over administrative financing is 
heightened by the unique nature of the UI program: no other federally 
funded program expands and contracts so much over the business 
cycle.
If UI administrative financing remains a discretionary item in the 
federal budget, the long-term survival of the UI system as a national 
unemployment program will be in jeopardy. Unfortunately, efforts by 
the states and the executive branch to work with Congress toward mak 
ing UI administrative financing "mandatory" under the federal budget, 
or to adopt some other similar rule, have not been successful.
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Ideas for Reform and Change: Recommendations from Two 
National Commissions
There has been no comprehensive reform of the UI system since 
1976. The Congress that enacted the Unemployment Compensation 
Amendments of 1976 did not expect that a two-decade hiatus in reform 
legislation would follow. Indeed, the 1976 legislation established the 
National Commission on Unemployment Compensation (NCUC). The 
final report'of the NCUC was issued in 1980 and has languished since 
then. In 1991, Congress established the Advisory Council on Unem 
ployment Compensation (ACUC) to take a fresh look at UI policy 
issues.
The reports and recommendations of these two commissions reflect 
their mandates to make major policy recommendations about the future 
direction of the UI program. Both were given the task of conducting a 
thorough review of the entire program. They each provided a different 
view of the potential scope and nature of major UI reform. This section 
briefly reviews both sets of recommendations to identify the similari 
ties and differences in their findings.
The scope and nature of the recommendations from these two panels 
differ greatly. The recommendations reflect the many changes that 
have occurred over the past two decades. The relevant changes affected 
the structure of the U.S. economy, the political environment at the state 
and federal levels, and state and federal government budgetary situa 
tions.
Nonetheless, there are some similarities between the two sets of rec 
ommendations. First, a shared principle is the ideal of insulating the UI 
program from federal budget considerations and from the influence of 
federal agencies other than the U.S. Department of Labor. This is 
reflected in the common recommendations to remove the UI trust fund 
from the federal unified budget, exempt UI benefits from federal 
income taxation, and let the states—instead of the Internal Revenue 
Service—collect the FUTA tax. The ACUC goes a step further in this 
regard and offers a recommendation to remove federal impediments to 
the collection of UI taxes for independent contractors. Second, there is 
agreement on a number of minor issues, such as
• extending agricultural coverage
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• making nonprofit organizations pay the FUTA tax
• strengthening the appeals process
However, the particulars of the NCUC and the ACUC recommenda 
tions on these and other matters differ significantly.
Increasing Federal Controls: National Commission 
on Unemployment Compensation
The Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1976 included 
the reforms upon which there was agreement. Congress left an agenda 
of further issues to be considered and created the NCUC to investigate 
the alternatives (see NCUC 1980).
The NCUC saw its role as completing the work begun by the Social 
Security Act of 1935: building a comprehensive, soundly financed 
income maintenance program for unemployed workers. Its members 
also wanted to insulate the program from federal budgetary disputes 
that might interfere with the operation of the UI system.
On the benefit side, the NCUC approved an ambitious set of recom 
mendations. For the regular UI program, it proposed a wide variety of 
federal standards that would raise benefit payments by increasing the 
maximum benefit level, raise replacement rates for benefit paid below 
the maximum level, and reduce the earnings required to qualify for the 
maximum duration of benefits. It also recommended federal require 
ments increasing coverage, easing eligibility requirements, and limit 
ing the reasons for disqualifications.
The NCUC further proposed a greatly enhanced extended benefits 
program, recommending lower thresholds for states to "trigger on" the 
existing permanent EB program during periods of high unemployment. 
In addition, it recommended a permanent emergency third-tier pro 
gram, over and above EB, which would also be triggered on by severe 
unemployment.
Moreover, the NCUC saw its role as the creator of a number of new 
federal programs. These included significant new UI plans such as 
reinsurance, which would buffer the states from unusually heavy bene 
fit costs, allowing them to maintain state solvency by pooling their 
independent state UI trust fund accounts. It also included major initia 
tives that went beyond the scope of the UI program, such as means-
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tested unemployment assistance for UI program exhaustees, an income 
maintenance program for displaced homemakers, and a lifetime 
reserve benefit program for workers 60 years of age and over.
At the same time, the NCUC recommended that the funding capac 
ity of the program be raised. It suggested that this be accomplished by 
expanding federal requirements for the states. The primary emphasis, 
however, was on federal legislative initiatives. The NCUC proposed 
that the federal taxable wage base be increased substantially and 
indexed for future adjustments. States were also asked to expand the 
tax capacity of their UI systems, largely by improving their state expe 
rience-rating provisions.
If enacted, the NCUC recommendations would have greatly 
increased UI system costs. A substantial portion of the additional pro 
gram cost would have been accommodated by a rise in state and fed 
eral UI payroll taxes. The NCUC also recommended more federal 
control of the system and more uniformity among individual state UI 
programs.
The composition and views of the NCUC membership reflected the 
Democratic Congress and President of the late 1970s. The final report 
of the Commission was completed on Labor Day, 1980. Shortly after 
ward, Ronald Reagan was elected president. As a result, the final report 
was put aside. Today, as in the 1980s, it seems that the economic, polit 
ical, and social environment gives little chance for adoption of most of 
the NCUC recommendations.
Exhorting States to Reform: Advisory Council 
on Unemployment Compensation
The Emergency Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 
1991 (Public Law [P.L.] 102-164), which initiated Emergency Unem 
ployment Compensation as a temporary third-tier extended benefit pro 
gram during the 1990-1991 recession, also established the ACUC. The 
legislation gave the Council a broad mandate to review the UI pro 
gram, instructing the council "to evaluate the unemployment compen 
sation program, including the purpose, goals, countercyclical 
effectiveness, coverage, benefit adequacy, trust fund solvency, funding 
of State administrative cost, administrative efficiency, and other 
aspects of the program and make recommendations for improvement."
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The final report of the Council was submitted in February 1996. The 
Council also released two annual reports, in February 1994 and Febru 
ary 1995.
The Council found "a pressing need to reform the Extended Benefit 
program," and its 1994 report concentrated on the permanent EB pro 
gram (ACUC February 1994). It proposed that extended benefits trig 
ger on in all states when the seasonally adjusted total unemployment 
rate (TUR) in the state exceeds 6.5 percent. 1 The ACUC recommended 
that the EB trigger continue to be based on statewide data and not on 
local or regional measures. To finance the increase in the cost of EB, 
the Council advocated that the federal UI taxable wage base be 
increased from $7,000 to $8,500.
The Council also recommended eliminating the federal requirement 
that individuals receiving EB must accept any job offered that pays at 
least the minimum wage or forfeit eligibility for EB. The Council 
advocated a policy of allowing states to set their own work tests for 
EB, just as they do for the regular UI program.
By congressional mandate, the Council also considered the UI sys 
tem's treatment of alien agricultural workers. Until January 1, 1995, 
wages paid to legal, temporary alien agricultural workers were exempt 
from the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA). The Council found 
that earnings of alien agricultural workers should be subject to the 
FUTA tax for two reasons. First, this levy would eliminate the cost 
advantage these workers offer to employers over domestic workers on 
whose earnings the tax must be paid. Second, the UI trust fund already 
bears the cost of certifying alien workers before their admittance to the 
United States, by funding the operation of the certifying agency, the 
U.S. Employment Service.
In its February 1995 report, the Council made recommendations on 
a broad range of issues, mostly dealing with the regular UI program 
and its financing. On the benefit side, the ACUC did not call for any 
federal standards. Instead, it urged the states to adopt a series of new 
approaches to UI eligibility, with the principal goal of improving bene 
fit eligibility and adequacy for low-wage, part-time, intermittent, and 
seasonal workers. Because the changes would be targeted to a small 
portion of the potentially eligible population of unemployed workers, 
there would be only a limited impact on the overall UI program. A
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small number of additional workers—mostly, but not exclusively, low- 
wage workers—would be able to collect UI benefits.
With respect to financing, the ACUC placed its emphasis on increas 
ing the "forward funding" of the UI program, to ensure sufficient bal 
ances in the individual state trust funds to finance benefits in future 
recessions. The ACUC offered only recommendations to states regard 
ing financing. It proposed that the program develop a new measure of 
adequacy of funding: the average of benefits paid by a state in its three 
highest-cost years during the previous twenty years. States were urged 
to maintain sufficient reserves to pay at least one year of benefits at that 
level. To encourage states to maintain adequate funding, the ACUC 
proposed giving them an additional percentage point of interest on all 
their UI reserve balances in excess of one "high-cost" year of reserves. 
To assure no additional cost to the federal budget, the interest rate pre 
mium would be funded by reducing—by two-tenths of a percentage 
point or whatever the balancing percentage is—the rate paid on a por 
tion of the reserves of a state, the amount by which such reserves fall 
short of the new target trust fund balance.
Proposals for federal legislative requirements were limited to pro 
viding incentives to states to forward-fund their programs. The incen 
tives recommended would be conditional interest-free loans or loan 
premiums and discounts for states that strive for forward funding of UI 
benefits.
With few exceptions, the final report of the ACUC (1996) concen 
trated on issues dealing with benefit payment and benefit financing 
provisions. In a vote divided along business and organized-labor lines, 
the ACUC recommended raising the taxable wage base to $9,000 and 
then indexing it to the annual increases in national average total wages 
in covered employment. As part of the same recommendations, the 0.2 
percent FUTA surcharge would be removed.
Proposed changes on the benefit side of the program dealt with the 
repeal of selected federal standards regarding denial of benefits to pro 
fessional athletes, reduction of benefits by the amount of pension pay 
ment, denial of benefits between school terms, and certain restrictions 
on EB receipt. The ACUC also recommended that federal guarantees 
strengthen the right to representation during appeals.
The main thrust of the final report, however, dealt with four other 
issues: federal-state relations, certain administrative matters, data and
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reporting, and administrative financing. With respect to the federal- 
state relationship, the ACUC proposed a new, narrow concept of fed 
eral responsibilities. The federal government should concentrate on 
two national objectives: assuring that states provide benefits without 
interstate competition and assuring forward funding of the UI tax sys 
tem.
The ACUC also developed a novel approach to federal administra 
tion and oversight. It asserted that the federal partner should no longer 
mandate a broad and comprehensive scheme of performance measures 
and should only require measures affecting those national interests that 
conflicted with the interests of the states. Such conflicts were not found 
to exist with day-to-day operations of the program, for example, in the 
traditional areas of program administration dealing with the timeliness, 
quality, and accuracy of the benefit payment and tax collection pro 
cesses. Thus, designing those measures should be left to the states. In 
particular, the ACUC recommended eliminating federal indicators of 
tax revenue and benefit payment accuracy, quality, and timeliness. It 
proposed that states be encouraged to develop their own wage replace 
ment measures. As a result, these indicators would not necessarily be 
subject to interstate comparison or to national aggregation.
According to the ACUC, existing federal performance measures 
should be replaced with "measures of access to the UI system." These 
indicators would deal with issues such as access to information about 
UI, ease of applying for benefits, and access to the system by seasonal, 
low-wage, and part-time workers. Thus, the existing federally man 
dated measures of day-to-day program performance would be replaced 
with indexes assessing how state policy and administration affect 
access to UI benefits.
The ACUC placed considerable emphasis on the data needs and 
reporting requirements of the UI system. Its recommendations 
included creating state-by-state UI data bases of comparable program 
data, implementing a new biennial supplement to the CPS dealing with 
UI issues, improving the state employment and wage (ES-202) reports, 
and developing a national longitudinal wage record data base.
Finally, the ACUC recommended improvements to UI administra 
tive financing. Congress was urged to provide adequate administrative 
funding on a regular basis. Grants to support innovation for cost effec 
tive administration were also advocated.
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Summary
Recommendations of the ACUC made in the mid-1990s were far 
more modest than those offered by the NCUC in 1980. The ACUC rec 
ommendations also appear to be more sensitive to the contemporary 
policy context in the states and Congress than were the recommenda 
tions of the NCUC. The current mood is dominated by a political aver 
sion to raising taxes and increasing expenditures. Despite the focused 
and measured advice of the ACUC, in this environment, federal UI leg 
islative reform is likely to be limited and incremental.
Retaining the Insurance Concept
As an insurance program, UI has to deal with the moral hazard of 
paying benefits to workers who may be purposely avoiding employ 
ment. This risk is addressed by the UI work test, which checks labor 
force attachment through Employment Service (ES) registration and 
provision of employment exchange and reemployment services. Many 
states also impose a weekly work search requirement.
The stringency of work search requirements varies considerably 
among states. Some states stipulate that unemployed workers who are 
not job attached make and document three job contacts per week. 
Other states have no specific requirements about job contacts or docu 
mentation. In all states, verification of reported work search contacts is 
limited or nonexistent.
There has been a strong tendency for states to reduce their work 
search requirements over time. By 1990, only 33 states required that 
individuals report their work search contacts. This trend is partly the 
result of the widely held belief that the work search requirement is not 
necessary or effective in promoting return to work. These changes also 
appear to be related to the introduction of the Benefits Quality Control 
program, which measures benefit payment accuracy and finds a high 
level of errors with regard to the work search process. Elimination of 
the work search requirement reduces the potential for erroneous pay 
ments based on its improper application.
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It is important for the states to have accurate information about the 
impact of the work test on the cost of the UI program and on the ability 
to assist individuals in returning to work. There has been little research 
on evaluating alternative approaches to the work search requirement. 
One demonstration project has been conducted, the Washington Alter 
native Work Search Experiment. The project tested four different work 
search approaches, ranging from a streamlined one that did not require 
claimants to report employer contacts, to a customized version that tai 
lored claimants' work search to their labor market characteristics and 
included intensive reemployment services early in the spell of unem 
ployment. The demonstration showed that, relative to the usual Wash 
ington work search requirement of three employer contacts per week, 
the streamlined approach significantly increased UI duration and UI 
payments, while the customized version with mandatory reemploy 
ment services significantly reduced UI payments (Johnson and Klepi- 
nger 1991, 1994).
Responding to concerns relevant to the findings of the Washington 
Alternative Work Search Experiment that work search requirements 
can affect UI durations and UI payments, the Department of Labor ini 
tiated the Maryland Work Search Demonstration in 1991. Its primary 
objective was to determine whether the stringency of the work search 
requirement affects UI durations, UI payments, and wages in subse 
quent employment. The demonstration was designed to provide data 
for policy initiatives for the states and the Labor Department to 
increase the effectiveness of the UI work search process. It both tested 
the benefits of the work search requirement and attempted to measure 
the effectiveness of the enforcement aspect compared to the reemploy 
ment services aspect.
The Maryland demonstration involved four treatment groups, each 
with a work search requirement differing with respect to stringency, 
verification of claimant contacts, and the provision of reemployment 
assistance. In the experimental design, claimants were randomly 
assigned to one of the four treatment groups or to a control group. 
Claimants in the control were given the current search requirements 
and services. Enrollment into the experiment began in 1993 and con 
cluded in early 1995.
The evaluation of the demonstration found that each of the four 
treatments had their expected effects. Additional work search contacts
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and verifications were each effective in reducing the duration of UI 
spells. Participation in a job search workshop—which was not targeted 
to those most in need as in worker profiling—was somewhat less effec 
tive in reducing UI spells. Finally, removing the requirement to report 
job search contacts was found to increase the UI spell, but the increase 
was relatively small, expecially compared to the similar Washington 
Alternative Work Search Experiment treatment, given the requirement 
to maintain regular contact with the UI local office (Klepinger et al. 
1997).
Adapting to a Changing World
Dislocation and the Need for Reemployment Services
In response to the growing importance of dislocated workers among 
the insured unemployed, the UI program has become more involved in 
promoting reemployment. Although dislocated workers represent only 
10 to 20 percent of UI claimants, they are the group of unemployed 
individuals in greatest need of reemployment assistance. The UI sys 
tem has a natural role in helping them because nearly all dislocated 
workers who remain jobless for long periods claim UI benefits. Since 
most dislocated workers apply for UI benefits when they first become 
unemployed, the UI program has the potential to direct claimants to 
reemployment services early in their spell of unemployment.
The Problem of Worker Dislocation
Worker dislocation as a policy issue in the United States can be 
traced back at least to the early 1960s. In 1961, unemployment climbed 
to 6.7 percent, a figure considered very high at the time. There were 
widespread fears that an acceleration in technological change—termed 
"automation"—would displace large numbers of workers in autos, 
steel, textiles, and other basic industries (Davidson 1972). In response, 
the Kennedy administration proposed and enacted the Manpower 
Development and Training Act (MDTA), the first national program 
designed to retrain experienced workers for new jobs.
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However, by 1964, unemployment had dropped back below 5 per 
cent, and the nation entered a long period of economic expansion. 
Most experienced workers were again employed in their former jobs, 
and it had become clear that the threat of widespread technological 
unemployment had been greatly exaggerated. In this environment, the 
focus of MDTA and other government-sponsored programs shifted to 
the needs of the economically disadvantaged in response to the newly- 
declared "War on Poverty."
After a twenty-year hiatus, worker dislocation reemerged as a major 
national issue in the early 1980s. During the 1981-1982 recession, the 
national unemployment rate climbed to a post-World War II record 
high of 10.7 percent. Plant closings and permanent mass layoffs in 
steel, autos, footwear, textiles, and other industries dislocated millions 
of experienced workers, and the worst fears of the early sixties became 
a reality in the eighties. Unlike the 1960s, many of the laid-off workers 
continued to be unemployed despite a strong economic recovery, as 
manufacturing employment declined sharply. By the end of 1984, with 
the economy nearly two years into recovery, unemployment remained 
well above 7 percent. The new economic reality of structural unem 
ployment had become painfully clear.
In 1984, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) at the U.S. Depart 
ment of Labor began conducting surveys to determine the size and 
characteristics of the dislocated worker population. While there are no 
universally accepted definitions of who is or is not a "dislocated 
worker," the BLS definition is a commonly used one. BLS defines dis 
located workers as individuals who had at least three years of tenure 
with their last employer and lost their job for reasons other than tempo 
rary layoff, for example, a plant closing or relocation, or the elimina 
tion of the job or shift.
These BLS dislocated worker surveys are special supplements to the 
CPS, a monthly survey of about 60,000 households carried out by the 
Bureau of the Census for BLS. They are conducted every two years 
and solicit retrospective information about the previous five years. For 
example, the 1984 survey asked about experience from January 1979 
to January 1984. The BLS survey covering the period from January 
1989 to January 1994 indicated that the problem of worker dislocation 
is substantial and growing. Based on this survey, there were 2.8 million 
workers in 1991 and 1992 who had at least three years of tenure with
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their employer and who were permanently displaced from their jobs, 
up from 2.2 million such workers in 1989 and 1990. The 1991 and 
1992 figures represent a rate of displacement of 3.8 percent for long- 
tenured workers, up from 3.1 percent in the prior two years. If all 
workers (regardless of tenure) who were displaced from their jobs are 
included in the count, the total number of dislocated workers in the 
BLS count rises to 5.4 million individuals for the years 1991 and 1992 
(Gardner 1995).
A recent study by the Congressional Budget Office looked at trends 
in worker dislocation throughout the decade of the 1980s. It used data 
from the BLS displaced worker surveys conducted in 1984, 1986, 
1988, 1990, and 1992. The study points out that the number of dislo 
cated workers during the 1980s varied substantially with the business 
cycle, ranging from a high of 2.7 million during the recession in 1982 
to a low of 1.5 million in 1988, five years into the economic recovery 
(Ross and Smith 1993, p. 7). However, during most of those years, the 
total number of dislocations ranged between 1.5 and 2 million workers 
annually.
While not all of these dislocated workers would have difficulty 
becoming reemployed, a large proportion of them, especially those 
with long job tenure, could benefit from some type of reemployment 
assistance. For example, workers with three or more years of tenure 
with their previous employer had longer spells of unemployment and 
were more likely to experience a reduction in earnings of 20 percent or 
more than were workers with less than three years of tenure (Ross and 
Smith 1993, pp. 20-25).
Reemploying Dislocated Workers: The Role of Unemployment 
Insurance
The traditional role of the UI program is to provide temporary par 
tial wage replacement to unemployed workers. In the process, the UI 
program tests whether unemployed workers are able, available, and 
actively seeking work. In most states, emphasis has been more on 
checking continuing attachment to the labor force than on attempting 
to promote reemployment.
In the 1980s and early 1990s, the problem of worker dislocation had 
become a prominent concern for insured unemployed workers. One 
indication of this recognition is that when the Unemployment Insur-
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ance Service developed its first "Mission, Vision, Values, Goals" state 
ment in 1992, it adopted the following: "The program's mission is to 
provide unemployed workers with temporary income support and to 
facilitate re-employment" (Wandner 1992). This statement made clear 
the emphasis placed on reemployment by the federal partner in the UI 
system.
Recently the UI program has been serving between 8 and 10 million 
unemployed workers each year. About one to two million of these indi 
viduals are dislocated workers, or about 10 to 20 percent of all workers 
served. These people, however, have needs beyond income support, 
and they frequently will have great difficulty in returning to work with 
out the assistance of reemployment service providers, generally either 
the ES or the Economic Dislocation and Worker Adjustment Assis 
tance (EDWAA) program.
Even though dislocated workers represent a reasonably small por 
tion of all beneficiaries of the UI system, they have received increasing 
attention in recent years. As seen in figure 15.2 for 1993, overall the UI 
program serves about half of all dislocated workers. Many dislocated 
workers return to work quickly, even though they have been perma 
nently separated, and apparently never file for UI benefits. In a recent 
dislocated worker study summarized in figure 15.3, UI was found to 
serve less than one-third of the dislocated workers unemployed less 
than five weeks, but 80 to 90 percent of those unemployed 15 weeks or 
longer. This is the great majority of all long-term unemployed dislo 
cated workers who are likely to need reemployment services.
Encouraging New Ideas and Experimentation
Finding Out What Works
For many years, the U.S. Department of Labor has used demonstra 
tions and evaluations to determine the effectiveness of existing pro 
grams. Its willingness to evaluate current programs and to test the 
potential of new initiatives using field experiments represents a desire 
to learn what works and what does not work. These efforts have gener 
ally been an attempt to develop the most effective and efficient pro 
grams possible to help employ and reemploy America's labor force. 
The Department has also periodically reviewed the research it has con-
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Figure 15.2 Total Unemployment, UI Beneficiaries, and Dislocated 
Workers, Calendar Year 1993




















SOURCE: U S Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Displaced Worker study, 1988.
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ducted to help determine what works and to develop and select from 
policy options (U.S. Department of Labor 1995).
Most of the initial Labor Department experiments were not related 
to the UI program. Beginning in the early 1980s, however, a demon 
stration dealing with the UI work search requirement was done in 
Charleston, South Carolina (Corson, Long, and Nicholson 1985). In 
the mid-1980s, the Unemployment Insurance Service became active in 
operating a series of experiments that tested and evaluated new 
approaches to return claimants to work, particularly if they were per 
manently separated from their previous employer and appeared to be in 
need of reemployment assistance.
The impetus for the UI demonstrations and their reliance on the field 
experiment approach came from a number of different places. First, the 
dislocated worker problem was becoming more important in the U.S. 
economy, and recognition of it as a public policy concern was increas 
ing. In 1985, awareness of this issue within the Department of Labor 
became greater when William Brock became Secretary of Labor, hav 
ing worked on international aspects of worker dislocation as the Spe 
cial Trade Representative. Second, in a period of extreme federal 
budget stringency, it was difficult to expect adoption of new policy ini 
tiatives that recommended extra or expanded programs. The exception 
to this situation would rest on an analysis of cost effectiveness that 
demonstrated that the new program would be beneficial to society as a 
whole and, if possible, to the government sector, such that the program 
might actually save money for the federal government. Third, with fre 
quent political divisions between Congress and the executive branch of 
the federal government, agreement about which economic policies 
work and which do not work is promoted by an evaluation method that 
is simple and direct.
Field experiments involve random assignment of large numbers of 
claimants to treatment and control groups, with the response to a new 
program change estimated as the difference in the average behavior of 
the two groups. With field experiments, there is no need to make ques 
tionable modeling assumptions or to use sophisticated statistical analy 
sis to yield meaningful results. Evidence from classically designed 
field experiments involving random assignment makes forging policy 
agreements easier.
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Just as the U.S. Department of Labor has done, some states have 
undertaken their own tests of what works to promote reemployment. 
Several states have committed resources to undertake studies and have 
initiated programs based on the results. Some of the state studies have 
involved experimental designs. In the 1970s and 1980s, Nevada tested 
two Claimant Employment Projects that were found successful in 
reducing UI durations by having a UI and ES team provide more inten 
sive reemployment services to UI claimants. The Reemploy Minnesota 
project duplicated the treatment of intensive job search assistance from 
the New Jersey experiment. The Washington Alternative Work Search 
Experiment evaluated alternative UI work search requirements and the 
provision of job search assistance (see U.S. Department of Labor 1990; 
Johnson and Klepinger 1991, 1994). In addition, in 1984, Illinois inde 
pendently initiated the nation's first experimental test of the reemploy 
ment bonus (Woodbury and Spiegelman 1987).
The Unemployment Insurance Experiments
Since the reemergence of worker dislocation as a national policy 
issue in the early 1980s, the Department of Labor has conducted eight 
experiments designed to test different reemployment service strategies 
to assist dislocated workers in making the transition to new employ 
ment. The following is a chronological list of the field experiments 
undertaken.
Experiment States involved
Multitreatment: job search New Jersey 
assistance, training grants, 
relocation grants, and 
reemployment bonuses
Reemployment bonus Washington and Pennsylvania
Self-employment assistance Massachusetts and Washington
Work search Maryland
Job search assistance District of Columbia and Florida
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The goal of these studies has been to determine what works for dis 
located workers, what doesn't work, and why. More specifically, these 
field experiments were designed to determine the impacts of various 
reemployment services, or combinations of services, on the subsequent 
labor market experience of dislocated workers. They examined out 
comes such as employment, earnings, and receipt of UI benefits and 
other income transfer payments. These studies have also attempted to 
estimate the cost-effectiveness of various services and to measure the 
return on investment of each service from the perspectives of partici 
pants, the government, and society as a whole (see Corson et al. 1992; 
Decker and O'Leary 1995; O'Leary, Spiegelman, and Kline 1995; 
Benus et al. 1995).
Conclusions about the Experiments
To date, analysis of the UI demonstrations has yielded three strong 
conclusions:
•Worker profiling and reemployment services: It is possible to 
develop a service delivery system such that the state UI and reem 
ployment service providers can identify dislocated workers early in 
their unemployment spell, determine the unique needs of individu 
als, and then promptly match each worker with appropriate and 
effective reemployment assistance.
• Job search assistance: Comprehensive job search assistance is a 
highly cost-effective strategy for accelerating the reemployment of 
dislocated workers. The experiments suggest that more suitable 
jobs are available than are yielded by casual, undirected job search. 
This reemployment service provided net benefits to participants, 
the government, and society as a whole. Job search assistance is an 
option that can be effective and efficient when made widely avail 
able for dislocated workers.
• Self-employment assistance: Self employment is of interest to only 
a small portion of dislocated workers, but half of those who partic 
ipated in experimental trials succeeded at starting their own 
microenterprises. The final evaluation of the Massachusetts dem 
onstration provides impact and benefit-cost analyses indicating 
that self-employment has promise as a labor market intervention 
for a small share of unemployed workers.
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The conclusions about the effectiveness of job search assistance are 
widely held, based on a number of state and federal experiments. For 
example, Meyer (1995) finds that
The job search experiments... try several different combinations of 
services to improve job search and increase the enforcement of 
work search rules. Nearly all combinations reduce UI receipt 
and... increase earnings. . . . The main treatments have benefits to 
the UI system that exceed cost in all cases, and societal-level cost- 
benefit analyses are favorable ... (p. 128).
He recommends that "On the services side we should consider making 
job search assistance universal. The exact combination of services we 
should include is not completely clear, but jobs search workshops and 
individual attention by the same personnel seem promising" (p. 125. 
See also Ross and Smith 1993; The Economist 1996).
Implementation of Unemployment Insurance Reemployment 
Promotion Options
In March and October 1993, Congress enacted worker profiling leg 
islation as sections of two extensions of the Emergency Unemploy 
ment Compensation Act. The October legislation required states to 
implement worker profiling provisions and to have their UI programs 
refer likely dislocated workers to reemployment services provided by 
existing state and federal programs. Under the Worker Profiling and 
Reemployment Services (WPRS) system, the UI role ends with the 
identification and referral of likely dislocated workers to reemploy 
ment services. The UI system cannot provide reemployment services 
and federal law does not allow UI trust fund money to pay for services. 
Traditional reemployment service providers must make the services 
available. With dislocated workers representing one to two million UI 
beneficiaries per year, the UI program is dependent on the ES and the 
EDWAA programs to devote substantial resources to providing these 
services.
To help with the implementation of this legislation, the Department 
of Labor provided states with technical assistance and over $20 million 
in funding to establish worker profiling mechanisms. The EDWAA 
program also provided states with nearly $20 million to build the 
capacity to provide reemployment services. By mid-1996, the WPRS
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initiative was operational in all states. Nearly 400,000 unemployed 
workers had been profiled and referred to reemployment services dur 
ing the early six-month operational period from October 1995 through 
March 1996.
As a result, implementation of the WPRS initiative generally has 
resulted in a cooperative and interdependent relationship between UI, 
the ES and the dislocated worker (EDWAA) portion of Job Training 
Partnership Act (JTPA) programs at the state level. This relationship 
has helped to create a kind of one-stop shopping for reemployment ser 
vices that has been gradually introduced by the states and promoted by 
the federal government. The UI system has become a "gateway" 
through which dislocated workers pass to receive reemployment ser 
vices from ES and EDWAA.
The primary emphasis of WPRS has been on the early identification 
of dislocated workers and referring them to reemployment services— 
primarily job search assistance. However, as both the New Jersey 
experiment and the early implementation of WPRS have shown, a 
small but significant portion of the dislocated workers cannot find 
employment through basic reemployment services alone. Many of 
these hard-to-place clients are referred to retraining, even though par 
ticipation in training is voluntary under WPRS. About one-fifth of the 
unemployed workers referred to reemployment services under the 
WPRS initiative were referred to retraining during the early phase of 
implementation (Wandner 1.996, 1997).
In another reemployment promotion option, the early evaluations of 
the self-employment demonstration projects had shown both substan 
tial positive economic impacts and net savings to the federal budget by 
1992. These findings were widely disseminated, and they made possi 
ble and encouraged two policy initiatives to enact enabling federal leg 
islation. The first was inclusion of a budget-neutral, self-employment 
initiative in the comprehensive workforce development plan of the 
Clinton administration, which was first made public in August 1993 
and later was introduced as the proposed Reemployment Act of 1994 
(see Wandner 1992; U.S. Department of Labor 1994a, 1994b).
For the UI program the proposed Reemployment Act placed equal 
emphasis on income replacement and reemployment. This initiative 
was named "Unemployment Insurance Flexibility," and it had three 
components. The first was a self-employment allowance, to be given in
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the form of periodic payments, which states would be authorized to 
adopt permanently. Secondly, states were authorized to adopt reem- 
ployment bonuses to be paid to permanently separated workers who 
speed their return to employment. Finally, the short-time compensation 
program to promote work sharing, which already existed in eighteen 
states, was encouraged and reauthorized.
A separate legislative effort was developed in mid-1993 by a group 
of legislators including Representative Ronald Wyden and Senators 
Edward Kennedy and Harris Wofford. They proposed a freestanding 
bill that would also authorize state self-employment programs involv 
ing periodic payments. The sponsors requested and received support 
from the Clinton administration for this bill which became an amend 
ment to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) imple 
mentation legislation (P.L. 103-182). As passed, the provisions expire 
five years after enactment, in December 1998.
Title V of the NAFTA Implementation Act provides that states may 
establish self-employment assistance (SEA) programs for unemployed 
workers as part of their UI programs. To establish such plans, partici 
pating states must enact legislation conforming to the federal legisla 
tion. The states of California, Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, 
Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, and Rhode 
Island have enacted legislation. Other states are considering similar 
legislative proposals. Self-employment programs can be initiated only 
after a state implementation plan is approved by the Department of 
Labor. On April 17, 1995, New York became the first state to imple 
ment a self-employment program. As of 1997, programs were opera 
tional in California, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, New Jersey, New 
York, and Oregon.
In states that operate SEA programs, UI claimants identified through 
worker profiling are eligible to participate. State SEA programs pro 
vide participants with periodic (weekly or biweekly) self-employment 
allowances during start-up of the self-employment activity. These sup 
port payments are the same weekly amounts that the UI claimant 
would otherwise receive in benefits, but participants can work full-time 
on starting their business enterprise instead of searching for wage and 
salary jobs. They can also fully retain any after-tax earnings from self- 
employment without any impact on their weekly self-employment sti-
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pend. The traditional UI work search provisions are waived and do not 
act as a barrier to self-employment for UI recipients.
Technology and the Decline of Unemployment Insurance Local Offices
Background
State UI program staff serve a large population of beneficiaries 
whose number varies inversely with the business cycle. In recent years, 
between 8 and 10 million claimants annually have received benefits. 
Funding for administration of the UI program, including staff salaries, 
also varies with the business cycle. The total of personnel staffing UI 
offices has fluctuated in recent years between 38,200 in 1990 (before 
the last recession) and 48,200 in 1993. This variatioahas been largely 
handled through the use of temporary employees. Among these work 
ers, about two-thirds are front-line staff who deal directly with benefit 
payments, while the others work in the UI tax revenue function.
Since UI administrative costs are paid for with funds held in the 
U.S. Treasury, they must be appropriated by Congress. Of late, admin 
istrative funding of UI has come under increasing scrutiny. As the 
information economy expands, Congress expects more administrative 
efficiency. At the same time, there has been increased concern that the 
UI system serve its customers—beneficiaries and employers—with 
close personal attention that improves over time.
The result is a UI program under pressure to enhance administrative 
performance while constrained by ever-dwindling financial resources. 
Additionally, the UI program and all other federal programs have 
begun to operate in accordance with the Government Performance and 
Results Act of 1993, which requires the management of programs to 
achieve measurable and objective performance outcomes. The center 
piece of improved UI operational efficiency has been a steady process 
of automation. Simultaneously, there has been an effort to bring all 
states up to an acceptable level of overall performance, while support 
ing continuous improvement in all states.
The Decline ofln-Person Claims Taking
The local UI office still has the public image of a place with long 
lines and lengthy waits to file for UI benefits. This image is perpetuated 
by the repeated use of television news library film clips from the 1982
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recession showing long lines in large, urban UI offices. Such clips are 
frequently shown when the latest UI initial claims figures are 
announced. The present reality is much different. States have actively 
pursued alternatives to in-person claims filing, which can improve cus 
tomer service and reduce administrative costs. Swarms of claimants 
rarely clog local UI offices today. Instead of coming to the local UI 
office, individuals increasingly file claims by mail or telephone, or 
employers file the claims for laid-off workers; alternatively, mass 
applications for benefits are taken by local UI office staff at the site of 
large layoffs. Claimants still filing in person find lines reduced by hav 
ing their in-take interview scheduled in advance to reduce peak-load 
problems, and by redesigned local offices and operational procedures. 
As telephone initial claims spread, local office lines will disappear 
altogether, and in many states there will be no physical local UI offices, 
only "virtual" offices accessed by telephones and computers.
Originally, UI program operations were largely manual. Both initial 
and continued claims were filed in person. The move away from in- 
person claims began in the 1960s and 1970s, with the acceptance of 
continued claims by mail. Unemployed workers still initially filed for 
benefits in local UI offices, but states began giving them continued 
claims forms, which they could then mail in on a weekly or biweekly 
basis. In the 1990s, interactive voice response units combined the 
power of telephones and computers to allow individuals to call in their 
continued UI claims. With touch-tone phones, claimants could now 
dial up the UI system and enter the data requested.
Today, in all but two states, fewer than 25 percent of continued 
claims are filed in person. All states allow at least some of their claim 
ants to file continued claims by mail, and, as a result, nearly four-fifths 
of claimants nationwide file continued claims that way. In addition, fil 
ing by telephone has rapidly begun to replace both claims by mail and 
in person. Continued claims filed by telephone went from zero in 1991 
to 11 percent by 1994. Meanwhile, in-person claims filing has steadily 
declined, reaching 9 percent in 1994.
While in-person continued claims taking has gradually declined 
over the past three decades with the spread of mail and telephone pro 
cedures, the taking of initial claims remained almost exclusively in per 
son until the 1990s. States began to take some initial claims over the 
telephone in the 1980s, but this was largely a low-volume, manual pro-
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cess, introduced in rural areas where geographically fixed local offices 
could not cost-effectively serve the small number of widely dispersed 
claimants. The taking of initial claims by telephone has recently gained 
in popularity because of new communication technologies, budget 
constraints on UI administrative funding, and new approaches to cus 
tomer service. Colorado led the way by eliminating all of its local UI 
offices in 1992, leaving ES offices open, but without any UI counter 
part. Since then, other states-are following suit. California, Massachu 
setts, and Wisconsin are operating or implementing telephone initial 
claim systems. Many other states are now actively involved in planning 
or implementing remote initial claims taking.
The Changing Labor Force and Unemployment Insurance
For some time, permanent, full-time attachment to the labor force 
among U.S. workers has been declining. There has been a correspond 
ing increase in looser and more intermittent attachment. This has 
meant a rise in the number of workers categorized as part-time, sea 
sonal, intermittent, and low wage.
The UI program, at both the federal and state levels, has maintained 
its traditional focus on providing strict insurance benefits for strongly 
attached workers and has not adapted to these changes. This fact has 
been discussed for decades. It was raised by the NCUC. More recently 
it has been raised by the ACUC. The following are some potential pol 
icy options for adapting the UI system to the current labor market envi 
ronment. Taken together, these proposals might help to adapt the UI 
program to the changing nature of the labor force in the United States.
1. Low-wage worker eligibility for UI: At present, all states, except 
Washington State, determine UI eligibility using quarterly wages 
during a one-year base period. This means that workers with 
higher hourly earnings are eligible for UI with fewer hours 
worked than are low-wage workers. A remedy for this situation 
could be to base eligibility on quarterly or annual hours worked 
instead of on quarterly earnings. The ACUC has recommended 
that the annual amount worked be set at 800 hours—the equiva 
lent of about two full days of work a week throughout a year.
To put this idea in perspective, one should note that the Cana 
dian government has adopted a similar proposal involving hours
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worked. The Canadian plan ties the hours-of-work requirement to 
the unemployment rate in the area. A claimant could be eligible 
with as few as 420 hours of work in the base year if the regional 
unemployment rate were 13.5 percent or more, or need at least 
700 hours if the unemployment rate were below 5.5 percent. 2
2. Part-time worker eligibility: In most states, part-time workers 
who are unemployed and seeking part-time work cannot receive 
UI unless they are searching for full-time work. Thus, individuals 
who chose to work part time are not eligible for UI. The ongoing 
and continued part-time status of these workers could be recog 
nized and encouraged by allowing previously part-time workers 
to collect UI while they are again seeking part-time work.
3. Seasonal worker eligibility: In many states, the ability of seasonal 
workers to receive UI benefits is limited. Fifteen states permit 
workers in seasonal industries to collect UI only during the sea 
son in which the industry work is normally conducted. In addi 
tion, thirteen of these states do not allow earnings in seasonal 
employment to count toward the monetary eligibility require 
ment, even if the worker subsequently works in a nonseasonal 
job. The purpose of these provisions is to prevent workers with 
only seasonal labor force attachment from collecting UI benefits 
during the off-seasons.
Eligibility could be broadened by allowing the use of seasonal 
wages for establishing eligibility, as long as workers also have 
nonseasonal employment. The Wisconsin approach might be fol 
lowed. Wisconsin allows workers to use seasonal wages if they 
earned at least $200 in nonseasonal employment during the year 
preceding the date of filing a UI claim.
4. Relatively recent labor force entrants: The standard base period, 
geared to the cycle of wage record systems, is the first four of the 
last five completed calendar quarters. With frequent movement 
into and out of the labor force, labor force attachment may be too 
recent to establish monetary eligibility using the standard base 
period. Six states—Maine, Massachusetts, Ohio, Rhode Island, 
Vermont and Washington—have responded to this situation by 
allowing workers who are not able to qualify for benefits using
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the normal base period to use an alternate, and more recent, one. 
It could be the last four completed calendar quarters or the most 
recent 52 weeks. Use of these more recent base periods generally 
requires requesting recent wage and employment data from the 
prior employer(s), rather than relying on previously reported 
quarterly wage records.
The ACUC has recommended that such an alternative base 
period be adopted nationwide. Recent estimates indicate that this 
approach would increase UI beneficiaries by 6 to 8 percent and 
raise total costs by 4 to 6 percent (Vroman 1995).
Another method for incorporating more recent wages would be 
to accelerate the use of the lag quarter as part of the base period. 
This approach would require employers to report employment 
and wage data more rapidly. The state would process and use 
these data for benefit eligibility determinations as soon as they 
became available. This technique would have two advantages. It 
would allow states to use the most recent four quarters of data 
within one to two months after the end of a quarter. It would also 
obviate the need for states to return to any wage request reporting 
by employers. Employer wage requests result in added employer 
and state agency administrative costs and in decreased data accu 
racy.
5. Expanding agricultural coverage: The UI system covers almost all 
wage and salary workers except agricultural workers on small 
farms. Eight states, including the major farm states of California, 
Florida, and Texas, provide broader UI coverage of agricultural 
work. While a percentage of American agricultural workers are 
covered because they work on large farms or in states that already 
provide small-farm coverage, the remaining workers on small 
farms in other states are still left without the protection of UI ben 
efits. The steps taken in the eight states might be used as models 
for all states.
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Looking Ahead
Looking ahead to the future of the UI program, there seem to be at 
least four major themes. First, given the national political environment, 
the prospect for and likely scope of UI reform appear to be only mod 
est in the near term. While the program is not likely to disappear or 
shrink precipitously, it is also not likely to expand greatly.
Arguing for its continued existence is the widespread belief that the 
UI program, like social security, is a social insurance critical to the 
well-being of the American workforce and the U.S. economy. The UI 
program is also likely to benefit from its highly decentralized form of 
administration. Its cooperative federal-state partnership has frequently 
been cited as a model working relationship between the states and the 
federal government.
Yet, the program that survives is not likely to have much in the way 
of enhancements in its benefit structure or increased revenues to fund 
these benefits or program administration. The UI program grew for the 
first three decades of its existence, but, in the 1970s to early 1980s, it 
reached a peak from which little further development can be expected 
in the near term.
The most uncertain area is extended benefits. It is not likely that 
there will be reform of the permanent EB program prior to a recession, 
if at all. It generally takes an economic downturn to draw congres 
sional attention to the needs of constituents back home who experience 
prolonged periods of unemployment. As noted, Congress has shown its 
preference for creating temporary emergency unemployment benefit 
programs in times of recession, and that may be its response to future 
downturns. Nonetheless, the permanent EB program is moribund and 
needs to be revived. It is good public policy to have an automatically 
triggered, second-tier UI program available, such that Congress only 
needs to add emergency extended programs during particularly severe 
recessions.
Second, public policies regarding the tax system and administrative 
financing are deficient and need repair. The taxable wage base has been 
inadequate for many years and puts an undue burden on tax rates for 
the system to remain solvent. Experience rating is limited and calls out 
for improvements. Administrative financing is proving inadequate to
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process the benefit and tax function of the program. The federal budget 
process needs to be modified to recognize that both the benefit and 
administrative portions of the UI program should be treated as "manda 
tory" under federal budget law. Instead of being treated as a discretion 
ary part of the UI program, administration should be treated as an 
entitlement.
Third, the public and its elected officials are intent on getting "value 
for money" in all government programs, including UI. The pressure of 
budget deficits has heightened the emphasis for a solid return on 
investment. For UI, this has meant increased concern about customer 
service, meeting a set of outcome goals, and continuous improvements 
in effectiveness and efficiency. As we have seen, the UI program has 
been working to enhance efficiency for many years. It has been auto 
mating its processes for decades and is increasingly making use of 
remote claims taking. Always relatively goal-oriented, it is becoming 
more so. This trend is likely to continue.
At the same time, the UI system is likely to retain its emphasis on 
program performance and on continuous improvement of that perfor 
mance. Whereas, in the past, UI has tended to rely largely on objective 
measures of customer service, in the future, it will also incorporate 
measures of customer satisfaction, which will be used for program 
assessment and policy development.
Finally, the issue of worker dislocation is likely to remain a major 
concern to the UI program, as well as to the rest of the employment and 
training system. The fact that the UI program sees most dislocated 
workers when they first become unemployed is likely to keep the pro 
gram at the focal point of the reemployment system. It is not antici 
pated that the UI program itself will provide or fund reemployment 
services, but UI will probably continue to be a referral agency, identify 
ing and sending dislocated workers to reemployment service providers.
NOTES
1 A redesigned CPS was implemented in January 1994 and appears to have increased the 
measured TUR somewhat; the ACUC recommendation was based on the old CPS methodology
2. See Government of Canada 1995. This provision was implemented on January 5, 1997 It 
also includes a higher hours requirement of 900 hours for reentrants and new entrants to the labor 
force
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